You hit one time in ten, your two opponents three and six, and you shoot first. Firing into the air is worth 965/4736 = 20.376%, which beats removing the strongest player by 0.195 percentage points, because a landed hit drops you into the duel you must enter second at 7/37 rather than first at 10/37. The article carries all three option values, the fixed points they solve, and the single Nash equilibrium that turns the usual assumption into a conclusion.
Also asked astruel · three way duel
Read the full explanation — The Weakest Player Should Waste the Turn
Expected value & market making →
Both seats in the marble game average a dollar a play, and that arithmetic stays true to the last line. Seat A carries variance 3/2 against seat B's 1, and seat A's law turns out to be seat B's law with one prize smeared outward, so every concave utility prefers B without variance ever being mentioned. Once both players stop flipping coins, seat B is ahead on the average too, at 1 against 3/4.
Acceptance restricts the value to below your bid, where a uniform variable averages half of it, and doubling half your bid returns exactly your bid. The expected profit is therefore identically zero at every bid up to 100 and 100 minus b above it, so there is no optimal bid to find. With a general multiplier the profit is b squared times k minus 2, over 200, making doubling the exact break-even multiple, and the article shows a value distribution starting at 50 where the same bidder profits.
Four settlements in five come back below the 1.50 outlay, and the average payoff is still 1.80, an edge of 0.30 a contract or twenty percent of the money at risk. The reflex is not bad arithmetic, it is the mode standing in for the mean. The article carries the tally over one full cycle, the threshold saying you need the large outcome more often than one time in eight, and the reason waiting longer can leave you less likely to be ahead.